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Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between business strategy and cost stickiness 
under different ownership. Using the data from listed firms in China from 2002 to 2015, we find that 
first, firms with different strategies exhibit different cost behavior. The cost stickiness of choosing a 
differentiation strategy is higher than that of choosing a low-cost strategy. Second, management 
expectations will affect cost stickiness. Optimistic expectations will increase cost stickiness, while 
pessimistic expectations will reduce cost stickiness. Third, management expectations can adjust the 
relationship between business strategy and cost stickiness in terms of government-created 
advantages (GCAs). If management expectations tend to be optimistic, the cost stickiness is higher 
with a differentiation strategy than with a low-cost strategy. If management expectations tend to be 
pessimistic, then cost stickiness is higher with a low-cost strategy than with a differentiation 
strategy. Finally, the state-owned equity affects the extent of the effect of a differentiation strategy 
on cost stickiness. State-owned firms, which receive more GCAs than non-state-owned firms, have 
stronger cost stickiness than non-state-owned firms, even if both categories of firms use more 
differentiation strategy.  
Keywords: business strategy; cost stickiness; state-owned firms; institutional advantages 
 
1. Introduction 
This study uses Porter's [1] business strategy typology to examine whether companies that 
follow different business strategies exhibit differences in asymmetric cost behavior and whether 
firms’ business strategies are a factor in determining cost stickiness. By exploring the extent to which 
firms following particular business strategies are more likely to exhibit different cost stickiness, we 
provide evidence that increases our understanding of the underlying determinants of cost stickiness.  
Traditional cost models assume that costs change symmetrically and proportionally with 
increases or decreases in activity [2]. However, recent empirical research demonstrates asymmetry in 
cost behavior — in other words, that costs increase more rapidly with activities than they decrease 
— which has been termed “cost stickiness” [3]. Recent studies have examined asymmetric cost 
behavior as a function of managerial deliberate cost adjustment [3–5], managerial optimism or 
pessimism [6], earnings management incentives [7,8], agency problem [9], earnings forecasts [10], 
capacity utilization [11], unemployment [12], product market competition [13], corporate social 
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responsibility [14], conservatism [15], and whether or not the costs are related to the core operations 
of a firm [16]. 
However, most of these studies ignore the effect of business strategy on cost stickiness, especially 
due to management expectations and different state-owned equity—which particularly affects 
emerging economy firms that have been strongly influenced by their government-created advantages 
(GCAs). Porter’s [1] business strategy typology is commonly used by companies and recognized as 
the dominant paradigm used in the literature related to competitive strategies, namely business cost 
leadership and differentiation strategies [17–21]. We address this gap in the literature by examining 
these associations in the context of an underlying determinant of firms’ cost stickiness—their business 
strategies. Using strategy theory, we focus on the association between firms’ business strategies and 
their cost stickiness. We begin by investigating the extent to which cost stickiness differs across 
business strategies. We then examine whether business strategy ultimately helps explain the 
observed variation in cost stickiness under different equity nature. This study is crucial since 
organizational theory (OT) delivers a framework for understanding how companies’ business 
strategies can contribute to their competition by cost management. 
In this paper, following strategy theory, we argue that managers will deliberately match a firm’s 
cost structure to the firm’s business strategy by intuitively adjusting how resources are committed 
depending on their expectation on the sales; in this case, the selection of business strategy will affect 
the firm’s asymmetric cost behavior. Anderson et al. [3] and Banker and Chen [22] argue that costs 
will be adjusted when the manager selects a business strategy because managers will have to increase 
or decrease the necessary or slack resources. Balakrishnan and Gruca [16] find that cost stickiness is 
only reliable in costs associated with an organization’s core services. Moreover, the cost stickiness of 
core services reliably exceeds that of ancillary and support services, which means that when an 
organization implements a differentiation strategy, the function representing the organization’s core 
competency influences the stickiness of associated costs. Managers tend to be hesitant to cut costs in 
their core activity associated with direct patient care both due to the acute nature of those services to 
the organization’s mission and due to the (greater) adjustment costs related to switching this capacity. 
As a contrast, it is substantially easier and less costly to adjust capacity degrees in outlying support 
services.  
Porter’s [1,23] generic business-level strategies, i.e., “overall cost leadership, differentiation, and 
focus”, have turned into a major paradigm in the corporate business policy literature. Each of these 
represents "a fundamentally different approach to creating and sustaining a competitive advantage” 
since “usually a firm must make a choice between them or it will become stuck in the middle” [23]. 
Additionally, Porter stressed that "achieving cost leadership and differentiation are usually 
inconsistent because differentiation is usually costly" [23]. The two main business strategies— cost 
leadership and differentiation—require firms to establish matched cost structures. Achieving a 
successful differentiation strategy position requires that a firm pursue technology leadership or 
create a high degree of brand loyalty; differentiators must invest considerable resources in 
establishing this specialized ability. Consequently, when the market is in a slump, differentiators are 
reluctant to reduce these slack resources, which are useless for other firms but highly expensive to 
construct. On the contrary, cost leadership is used primarily to gain an advantage over competitors 
by reducing operation costs below those of others in the same industry, resulting in a lean cost 
structure and low adjustment costs. Consequently, the choice of business strategy may affect the cost 
structure as well as the cost stickiness.  
In addition, governments tend to interfere in state-owned firms’ decision-making procedures 
and demand corporate activities, which can be desirable from the socio-political view. For instance, 
in order to secure political support, politicians can request state-owned firms to avoid layoffs to 
mitigate unemployment rates. The varied purposes of state-owned firms, too, make it more difficult 
to monitor managerial behaviors, leading to larger managerial discretion and to the self-interest 
pursuit via empire-building behaviors. Not only state intervention but also managers’ self-interests 
hinder them from laying employees off or cutting off investment when sales decrease, which may 
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lead to greater cost stickiness. However, it is not clear how the interaction of business strategy and 
state ownership affects the cost stickiness. 
Using the longitudinal panel data from listed companies in China from 2002 to 2015, our results 
support our predictions and show a significant relationship between business strategy and cost 
stickiness. First, different business strategies lead to different cost behaviors. The cost stickiness of 
choosing a differentiation strategy is higher than that of choosing a low-cost strategy. Second, 
different management expectations affect cost stickiness. Optimistic expectations will increase cost 
stickiness while pessimistic expectations reduce cost stickiness. Third, management expectations can 
adjust the relationship between corporate strategy and cost stickiness. If management expectations 
tend to be optimistic, the cost stickiness is higher with a differentiation strategy than with a low-cost 
strategy. If management expectations tend to be pessimistic, then cost stickiness is higher with a low-
cost strategy than with a differentiation strategy. Finally, state-owned equity affects the extent of the 
effect of a differentiation strategy on cost stickiness. State-owned firms, which receive more GCAs 
than non-state-owned firms, have stronger cost stickiness than non-state-owned firms, even if both 
categories of firms use more differentiation strategy. 
By linking three kinds of research literature, i.e., OT and market competition (MC) theory from 
management studies and cost management from the accounting research literature, our contributions 
are threefold. Firstly, we deliver the attestation that firms that follow dissimilar corporate strategies 
indeed present dissimilar degrees of cost stickiness, which extends the literature of cost stickiness in 
search through whether the corporate strategy is a basal determinant of earnings management. 
Secondly, although previous accounting studies have investigated corporate strategy as a 
determinant of compensation [24], budgetary usage [25], accounting control systems [26], and in the 
concurrent study as a determinant of tax aggressiveness [27] and financial reporting and auditing 
[28], this paper contributes to this stream of literature by providing attestation that corporate strategy 
has an even wider application to cost management than previously considered. Finally, this study 
shows how the interaction of business strategy and property will impact cost stickiness, which 
extends the literature of both property theory and cost management. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the research methodology and data. Section 4 illustrates 
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes this paper. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses  
2.1. Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
The traditional cost behavior models, built-up in the accounting research literature, make a 
difference between variable and fixed costs concerning changes in the volume of activities. Variable 
costs tend to predict an increase by 1 percent for a 1 percent growth in activity and a decrease by 1 
percent for an equal cutback in activity while fixed costs tend not to vary [29]. However, cost 
stickiness is the asymmetrical behavior of costs depending on the direction of the sales change. 
Meanwhile, Noreen and Soderstrom [30] argue the asymmetric cost behavior possibility as the 
‘traditional belief’, recent studies provide proves that cost changes tend not to be inevitably 
proportional or even symmetric to changes in sales volume, yet to exhibit “stickiness”. In their 
influential study, Anderson et al. [3] build on the results of Noreen and Soderstrom [30,31] and 
empirically address the question of whether the relation of cost and volume depends on the direction 
of activity changes. They suggest a substitutable cost behavior model that makes the purpose of 
giving an explanation of the differentiated reactions to ascending and descending changes in sales 
activity. In the model, cost stickiness’s cause is established by two observations. Firstly, substantial 
costs increase since managers make their decisions for deliberate resource commitments. Secondly, 
switching committed resource degrees tend to be costly since it necessitates suffering resource 
adjustment costs, e.g., hiring and lay-off of employees, or disposal/installation costs for apparatus. 
They claim that as sales decline, managers would have a favor for retaining certain extents of excess 
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capacity costs rather than to reduce the SG&A costs instantly and make and increase on the resources 
back at a subsequent time if sales bounce back in the future. 
Anderson et al. [3] and following studies emphasize the economic and agency drivers and 
behavioral sources for cost stickiness relatively recently. Firstly, diverse literature affirm the 
adjustment cost explanation of sticky costs based on empirical tests from proves of the association 
between the adjustment cost degree and the cost stickiness degree by utilizing dissimilar empirical 
adjustment proxies. Based on the data of hospital, Balakrishnan and Gruca [16] argue higher cost 
stickiness in the services for patients relative to support services because of higher adjustment costs 
in the core activities. Banker et al. [32] utilize the legislative provisions for employment protection in 
disparate countries as a proxy for labor adjustment costs and argue a statistically and economically 
significant relationship between cost stickiness at the company level and the employment security 
regulation strictness. 
In addition, cost stickiness tends to be affected by managers’ expectations. If sales have 
decreased in that period, but managers predict sales to be rebounded subsequently, they could abide 
by the supplemental capacities rather than suffer the adjustment costs of degrading and then re-
adjusting the resources subsequently when sales augment anew. Empirical investigations for the 
managers’ expectations for subsequent sales, as one of the sources for cost stickiness, are conducted. 
Anderson et al. [3] utilize revenue decrease in an anterior period and gross domestic product (GDP) 
excrescence as a proxy for managers’ optimism. As predicted, they affirm the effect of managerial 
expectations for subsequent sales on the extent of cost stickiness. Using growth and recession 
industries to proxy with the optimism and pessimism, Banker et al. [6] find the cost stickiness of 
optimistic managers is stronger than that of pessimistic managers.  
While adjustment costs and managerial expectations are the economic determinants of cost 
stickiness, managerial incentives have, too, been exhibited to trigger cost stickiness. Managers tend 
to draw private benefits out from deliberately postponing or abstaining from the abatement of 
committed resources, e.g., employees and given fixed assets, whilst it could be in the corporate 
attention to reduce those resources. Chen et al. [9] reveal that agency costs associated with empire-
building is likely to bring managers on to abide by to exceed resources and augment cost stickiness. 
These empire-building incentives are driven, at least in part, by incentive-based compensation. Kama 
and Weiss [8] reveal that when managers encounter incentives to dodge losses or earnings decrement 
or to face financial analysts’ earnings predictions, these managers cause descending acclimation of 
slack resources for sales abatements to happen faster. Those thoughtful decisions reduce the extent 
of cost stickiness. 
2.2. Hypotheses Development 
The different forms of corporate differentiation strategy mainly include customizing 
differentiated products according to consumer demand differences and maintaining product-specific 
technology and performance characteristics, among other forms [33]. Companies carry out 
specialized investments because they implement differentiation strategy, which gradually shapes the 
enterprise’s intangible assets or specific assets in accounting. On the one hand, these specific assets 
enhance the companies’ core competitiveness. However, companies are not free to sell or transfer all 
of their dedicated resources, such as their researchers’ knowledge, workers with specialized 
production capacity, employees who are proficient in product marketing, and managers who are 
familiar with corporate culture and practices, as well as the construction of specialized machinery 
and equipment [34,35]. Therefore, during a sales downturn, companies following a differentiation 
strategy will face higher adjustment costs. These companies cannot cut costs; therefore, they will have 
to bring these remaining resources into the next period of production until the adjustment costs 
surpass the costs of the balance brought about by cutting resources. In addition, because the 
development of specialized assets requires considerable time due to investment and construction, 
and because it is difficult to make a one-time purchase in the factor market, the specialized assets 
formed by enterprise investment in the supply side lead to lack of flexibility, which is actually the 
threshold of a differentiation strategy. Both product innovation and service differentiation strategies 
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require a large range of business cost adjustments. Once business shrinks and pre-research & 
development (R&D) investments cannot be efficiently digested, corporate cost control will be greatly 
impacted. When corporate sales decline, companies that choose differentiation strategy are faced 
with higher upward adjustment costs rather than cutting their investment, which means that 
companies following differentiation strategy may show higher cost stickiness than others.  
The low-cost strategy reduces operating costs through the implementation of the effective scale, 
which makes costs lower than competitors’ costs. Companies that choose a low-cost strategy will do 
more to control costs in order to provide their products and services at a low price. Porter [1] argues 
that companies must build efficient, large-scale production facilities, go all-out to reduce costs, tightly 
control costs, and manage R&D, service, marketing, and advertising expenses as well as other costs. 
Therefore, when current sales decline, a low-cost strategist tends to cut costs in a timely manner in 
order to maintain or increase its market share. Therefore, companies that choose a low-cost strategy 
have lower adjustment costs and a more flexible cost structure. In summary, when corporate sales 
decline, companies implementing differentiation strategy will maintain the remaining production 
capacity, while those with low-cost strategy will quickly cut investments or reduce costs. Therefore, 
we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Ceteris paribus, the cost stickiness of firms using a differentiation strategy, will be higher 
than that of firms using a low-cost strategy.  
The managerial expectation is generally divided into two states, optimism and pessimism. In the 
case of optimism, there may be two conditions. First, if future sales maintain growth and managerial 
expectation is optimistic, management will tend to expand the scale of production and increase the 
commitment to resources. Second, if the future sales volume declines, managers will consider this to 
be a temporary adjustment and will choose not to reduce a variety of committed resources because 
reducing committed resources will lead to higher adjustment costs [36]. As a result, cost stickiness is 
much higher when sales decline than when sales are meeting expectations. However, if sales continue 
to decline, managers will become pessimistic. Under such conditions, managers will significantly 
reduce investment and production capacity, which will lead to cost anti-stickiness. Therefore, our 
second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Ceteris paribus, managers’ optimism will result in cost stickiness, while managers’ 
pessimism will result in cost anti-stickiness.  
Since management expectations may affect cost stickiness, it is possible to adjust the relationship 
between corporate strategy and cost stickiness. Based on the two-period sales situation, we analyze 
managers’ investment decision-making behavior in firms that use different types of strategy. First, 
assuming that sales in year t-1 increase, while sales in year t decrease, managers may still remain 
optimistic. In a firm using differentiation strategy, due to the characteristics of asset exclusivity and 
higher adjustment costs, managers will not reduce the scale of production but instead forward the 
excess production capacity to the next period. Therefore, companies that use differentiation strategy 
show higher cost stickiness than others. Firms that use low-cost strategy need to keep low adjustment 
costs and a flexible cost structure. In circumstances where manager expectations are optimistic, cost 
stickiness for companies using low-cost strategy will be much smaller than that of companies using 
differentiation strategy when current sales decline. 
However, with two successive periods in which sales decline, managers may become pessimistic 
and may reduce the resources committed. Unlike in optimistic scenarios, in these pessimistic 
scenarios, companies that choose differentiation strategy will cut the excess capacity on a large scale. 
It is difficult to sell existing production capacity in a timely manner because asset exclusivity is too 
strong; in other words, valuable resources among companies that implement differentiation strategy 
may be less valuable for other businesses. Therefore, using differentiation strategy may lead to lower-
cost anti-stickiness. For companies that choose a low-cost strategy, their lower adjustment cost and 
cost structure will lead them to significantly reduce their resource investment in order to reduce costs. 
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Therefore, when managers have pessimistic expectations, companies that have chosen a low cost 
strategy will exhibit stronger cost anti-stickiness. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Ceteris paribus, if management is optimistic, firms that choose differentiation strategy 
have higher cost stickiness than those who choose low-cost strategies (H3a); Ceteris paribus, if management is 
pessimistic, firms that choose a low-cost strategy have higher cost anti-stickiness than those who choose a 
differentiation strategy (H3b).  
Heterogeneous ownership types deliver differential incentives for owners to make 
commitments in cost-controlling activities, since ownership type commands how these activities’ 
benefits are augmented to owners [37–39], resulting in differential cost behaviors of companies with 
differential owners [40,41]. 
Agency cost is the main reason behind cost stickiness. We argue that the different agency costs 
between state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms in China will affect managers’ decisions when 
facing demand uncertainty. Due to differences in the appointment of managers, performance 
contracts, and management’s goals, there should be greater agency conflict in state-owned firms than 
in non-state-owned firms, which would, therefore, result in higher cost stickiness in the former than 
in the latter. 
Additionally, state-owned firms have a more social responsibility and more protection for 
employees, which leads to an inelastic cost structure. To be specific, when implementing differential 
strategy, which requires specialized equipment and employees, managers in state-owned firms find 
it more difficult to cut down costs by layoffs or selling specialized equipment than managers in non-
state-owned firms do. Therefore, cost stickiness in the former is higher than in the latter. Holzhacker 
et al. [42] investigated the impact of fixed-price regulation on the cost structures in the healthcare 
industry and found that a change to fixed-price regulation imposes cost pressures and increases 
operational risk because the firms’ revenue function is much less related to the cost function. In 
response, firms will make two broad changes to their cost structures. The first is to increase cost 
elasticity, and the second is to decrease the extent of cost asymmetry. 
Our context of emerging market firms, particularly Chinese firms, is in line with Ramamurti and 
Hillemann’s [43], （p. 40）argument that “[t]he government is not just another institution – it is a key 
institution that shapes many other institutions in the country…that affect the international 
competitiveness of firms” since these firms are responsive to cost elasticity and cost asymmetry. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Ceteris paribus, compared to non-state-owned firms, a differentiation strategy in state-
owned firms has more impact on cost stickiness. 
3. Research Methodology and Data 
3.1. Econometrics Specification 
Most studies in the literature adopt the cost stickiness model developed by Anderson et al. [3], 
which is based on a piecewise-linear relation (A piecewise linear function is a function defined on an 
(possibly unbounded) interval of real numbers, in a way that there is a collection of intervals on each 
of which the function is an affine function [44]. An affine function represents vector-valued functions 
of the form, such as f(x_1,...,x_n)=A_1x_1+...+A_nx_n+b [45]. The coefficients can be scalars or dense 
or sparse matrices. The constant term is a scalar or a column vector.) between logarithm changes in 
costs and concurrent logarithm changes in sales.  
ln ቀ ௖௢௦ ௧೟௖௢௦ ௧೟షభቁ =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵln(
ோ௘ ௩೟
ோ௘ ௩೟షభ) + 𝛽ଶDec ⋅ ln(
ோ௘ ௩೟
ோ௘ ௩೟షభ) + 𝜀௧ (1) (1) 
where ln( ௖௢௦ ௧೟௖௢௦ ௧೟షభ) is the logarithm change in costs of firm i in year t, ln(
ோ௘௩೟
ோ௘௩೟షభ) is the logarithm 
change in sales revenue, the cost is the sum of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs, and 
operating cost. Rev is the sales revenues of firm i in year t. Dec is a dummy variable taking the value 
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1 if sales revenue decreases relative to it in the last year and zero otherwise, and ε is an error term. 
The slope coefficient β1 approximates the percentage change in costs for a one percent sales 
increase, characterizing the relative importance of variable costs. The coefficient β2 captures the 
degree of asymmetry in cost response to sales decreases versus increases. Therefore, (β1+β2) 
represents the extent of the change in costs with a one-unit decrease in sales. If a firm exhibits cost 
stickiness, β2 is expected to be negative because managers with optimistic expectations may not 
restrict slack resources as they believe the decreased sales will not last long, and the adjusted cost 
may exceed earnings due to the reduction of these slack resources. However, some companies with 
pessimistic managers may appear “anti-stickiness”. When managers initially realize that sales are 
declining and are pessimistic about subsequent sales, they will significantly cut back on costs when 
sales decrease in the current period, which makes β2 positive. 
To test our hypothesis H1 and H4, we modified model (1) by adding a strategy variable and 
other control variables. Anderson et al. [3] argue that the macroeconomic environment, denoted by 
the economic growth, as well as firm-specific characteristics such as asset intensity (ratio of total 
assets to sales revenue) and employee intensity (ratio of number of employees to sales revenue), will 
impact the degree of cost stickiness. 
ln ൬ cost୲cost୲ିଵ൰ =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝛽ଶ Dec୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝛽ଷ Strategy୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰
+ 𝛽ସDec୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Asset୲
Rev୲ ൰ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰
+ 𝛽ହDec୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ ⋅ ln ൬
Emp୲
Rev୲ ൰  + 𝛽଺Dec୲ ⋅ Suc_Dec୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰
+ 𝛽଻Dec୲ ⋅ GDP୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝜀௧    
(2) 
where 𝑆tr𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦௧ is the strategy position. 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡௧ , 𝐸𝑚𝑝௧ , and 𝐺𝐷𝑃௧ represent the total asset, the 
number of employees, and the growth rate of GDP in year t, respectively. Suc_Dect is the successive 
sales revenue decrease for two years. 
We also incorporate the strategy variable to investigate its indirect impact on the cost change for 
robustness as follows:  
ln ൬ cost୲cost୲ିଵ൰ =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝛽ଶStrategy୲ + 𝛽ଷ Dec୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝛽ସDec୲
⋅ Strategy୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝛽ହDec୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Asset୲
Rev୲ ൰ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰
+ 𝛽଺Dec୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ ⋅ ln ൬
Emp୲
Rev୲ ൰
+ 𝛽଻Dec୲ ⋅ Suc_Dec୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝛽଼Dec୲ ⋅ GDP୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝜀௧ 
(3) 
where Dec௧ is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the sales revenue decreases in year t compared to t-
1, and otherwise equals 0. Therefore, β1 in formula (2) and β2 in (3) measure the change of cost 
relative to the sales revenue increase of 1%; in other words, when sales increase by 1%, costs will rise 
by β1% in (1) or β2% in (2). (β1 +β2) represents the percentage of decrease in costs when sales decline 
1 unit; when sales fall 1%, the costs go down (β1 + β2) %. When costs exhibit stickiness, then β2＞
β1+β2 and β1＜0; when costs exhibit anti-stickiness, then β2＜β1+β2 and β1＞0. Based on H1, β3 in 
the model (2) and β4 in (3) capture the impact of strategy on cost stickiness. When these coefficients 
increase, the impact of differentiation strategy likewise increases. In that case, we expect these 
parameters to be negative. To test our H4, we divide the sample into two sub-samples, state-owned 
firms and non-state-owned firms. We then run regressions (2) and (3) within these two sub-samples 
and compare the magnitude of the main coefficients between them. 
To test H2, H3a, and H3b, following Banker et al. [46], we construct a model to investigate the 
impact of strategy on cost stickiness under different managerial expectations: 
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ln ൬ cost୲cost୲ିଵ൰  =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ
௉ூ௡௖ ⋅ I௧ିଵ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝛽ଶ
௉ூ௡௖ ⋅ Dec୲ ⋅ I୲ିଵ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰
+ 𝛽ଷ௉ூ௡௖ ⋅ Dec୲ ⋅ I୲ିଵ ⋅ Strategy୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ +𝛽ଵ
௉஽௘௖
⋅ 𝐷௧ିଵ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝛽ଶ
௉஽௘௖ ⋅ Dec୲ ⋅ I୲ିଵ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰
+ 𝛽ଷ௉஽௘௖ ⋅ Dec୲ ⋅ Dec୲ିଵ ⋅ Strategy୲ ⋅ ln ൬
Rev୲
Rev୲ିଵ൰ + 𝜀௧ 
(4) 
where It－1 and Dect-1 are dummy variables. It－1 equals 1 when sales increase in year t-1 and otherwise 
0. Dect-1 takes the value 1 if sales decrease in year t-1 and otherwise 0. In model (4), β1PInc captures the 
percentage of cost increase when sales go up 1% in an optimistic management scenario. (β1PInc + β2PInc) 
represents the percentage of cost decrease if sales decline 1 unit in an optimistic management scenario. 
β1PDnc measures the percentage of cost increase when sales increase 1% in a pessimistic management 
scenario. (β1PDec + β2PDec) represents the percentage of cost decrease if sales decline 1 unit in a 
pessimistic management scenario. H2 expects that a firm will exhibit cost stickiness if managers are 
optimistic about the future. Therefore, if β1PInc ＞ (β1PInc +β2PInc), then β2PInc < 0; in other words, β2PInc is 
expected to be significantly negative while costs will appear anti-stickiness under a pessimistic 
scenario in which β1PDec < (β1PDec + β2PDec) and then β2PDnc >0 and β2PDec is expected to be significantly 
positive. If β1PInc and β1PDec are significantly positive, we anticipate β1PInc > β1PDec, which implies that 
the managers with different expectations about the future have different preferences regarding 
investment. Under H3a and H3b, we expect β3PInc and β3PDec to be significantly negative.  
3.2. Variables and Data 
3.2.1. Variables 
There are essentially two ways to measure the cost stickiness, a direct way, and an indirect way. 
The direct way was developed by Weiss [47] and adopted by Kama and Weiss [8], Balakrishnan et al. 
[48], and others. This method measures cost stickiness on a rolling basis as the difference between the 
mean of the quarterly cost function slope under upward adjustment made over quarters t-8 through 
t and the mean of the quarterly cost function slope under downward adjustments made over the 
same period. The stickiness measure reflects the difference between the rate of cost decreases for 
quarters with decreasing sales, and the rate of cost increases for quarters with increasing sales. If costs 
are sticky, meaning that they decrease less when sales fall than they increase when sales rise by 
equivalent amounts, then the stickiness variable will have a positive value, with a higher value 
representing stickier cost behavior.  
However, most prior literature has adopted the indirect measurement of cost stickiness, which 
uses the percentage of cost change. Considering that cost change might vary with many other factors 
such as a managerial decision or cost management, we intend to use the percentage of the sale and 
administration cost change along with the percentage of operating cost change to measure cost 
stickiness. 
The first dependent variable is a business strategy (Strategy). Existing literature identify business 
strategies using two main methods. The first method is the questionnaire that surveys corporate 
strategy. For example, Dess and Davis [49] used a questionnaire to identify a firm’s strategy. On the 
other hand, some articles use existing data to construct an index that allows them to recognize a firm’s 
strategy position. In our paper, following Bentley et al. [28], we construct a discrete Strategy 
composite measure, which proxies for the organization’s business strategy. Higher Strategy scores 
represent companies with differentiation strategies and lower scores represent companies with low 
cost strategies. Similar to Bentley et al. [28], we utilize the following features for the composite 
measure for Strategy, i.e., first, “the ratio of research and development (R&D) to sales”, second, “the 
ratio of employees to sales”, third, “a historical growth measure (one-year percentage change in total 
sales)”, fourth, “the ratio of marketing (SG&A) to sales”, fifth, “a measure of employee fluctuations 
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(standard deviation of total employees)”, and, sixth, “a measure of capital intensity (net PPE scaled 
by total assets)”, respectively. 
The second dependent variable is state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Following the literature such 
as Hall [40], Anderson et al. [3], the dummy variable SOE equivalent to 1 if the government owns a 
certain percentage of the firm’s shares while 0 otherwise.  
And then following the Anderson et al. [3], we use a dummy variable Dec that equals 1 if sales 
decrease in the current year and 0 otherwise to define the sales decrease and use Suc_Dect which 
equals 1 if sales revenue declined in the preceding period; otherwise 0 to define the preceding sales 
revenue decline. 
We, too, include control variables common in the literature which may affect the cost stickiness 
such as (1) China annual real growth rate (GDP) captured by the effect of macroeconomic growth, (2) 
employee intensity (Emp) represented by the ratio of the number of employees to sales revenue, (3) 
asset intensity (Cap) captured by the ratio of assets to sales revenue, (4) industrial effect (Indy) and 
year effect (Year). These control variables are commonly used in many studies, which indicate they 
have effects on cost stickiness. All the variables are defined in Table 1. 
Table 1. Variable definitions. 
Variable  Variable Definition 
Independent 
variables   
The logarithm of change in selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs 
ln(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥௧
/𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥௧ିଵ) The logarithm of change in operating costs  
Dependent 
variables 
Strategy Bentley, Omer and Sharp’s [28] strategy measures 
ln( ோ௘ ௩೟ோ௘ ௩೟షభ)  Logarithm of change in sales revenue 
Dect 
Dummy variable, equals 1 when the sales of a firm in year t decrease compared to the 
sales in the prior year t-1; otherwise, 0
Suc_Dect 
Dummy variable, equals 1 for firm-year observations when sales revenue declined in 
the preceding period; otherwise, 0. 
SOEs 
Dummy variable SOE equals 1 if the government owns a certain percentage of the 
firm’s shares, while 0 otherwise. 
Control  
variables 
Emp Defined as the ratio of the number of employees to sales revenue 
Cap
 
Defined as the ratio of the total assets to sales revenue. 
GDP Defined as the annual growth rate of China’s real gross domestic product 
IND Industrial dummy variable for 72 three-digit SIC industries 
3.2.2. Sample Selection and Data Sources  
This paper uses annual data from the Wind database and the China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database nonfinancial listed firms for the years 2002–2015. In line with Borisova 
et al. [50], the present paper defines direct state ownership to involve ownership by provincial or 
municipal governments, such as non-central government entities, and entities built-up particularly 
to maneuver the central government’s funds. In doer to secure the accurateness and validity for our 
data, we collect information regarding the companies’ state shareholders from annual reports as well 
as websites. The verification proceeding spans all available annual reports for all the firms. If there is 
no information regarding corporate shareholders, this paper depends on the CSMAR data. Following 
Anderson et al. [51] and Banker et al. [52], the paper delete firm-year data s with missing, zero, or 
negative values for revenues, labor costs and total assets, as well as firms with sales increase greater 
than 50% or decrease more than 33%, since such large changes may indicate mergers and divestitures 
[52]. Moreover, we delete firms with missing values regarding state ownership and require that firms 
utilize the same reporting standard within two previous years. Lastly, continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. As a result, lastly, we obtain 20,945 firm-year observations. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of our main variables. The average SG&A (Selling, 
General and Administrative Expenses) cost is 17.54% of sales, with a standard deviation of 18.29% 
and a median of 12.68%. The average operating cost is 92.35% of sales revenue, with a standard 
deviation of 19.92% and a median of 92%. Average Dec is 0.265, which implies that 26.5% of firms’ 
sales experiences decrease while most firms gain an increase in sales between Year 2002 and 2015. 
)log(
1,i
,i
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The average strategy score is 18 (the maximum is 30 and the minimum equals 6), indicating that most 
companies choose differentiation strategy. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean P50 Sd Min Max 
Sales revenue 64.80 11.50 585.00 0.00 28400.00 
Selling, general, and administrative costs 5.36 1.40 34.40 0.01 1480.00 
Operating costs 58.00 10.20 504.00 0.02 25600.00 
SG&A costs as a percentage of sales revenue 17.54 12.68 18.29 1.664 131.2 
Operating costs as a percentage of sales revenue 92.35 92 19.92 47.22 212.5 
ln( 𝑅𝑒 𝑣௧𝑅𝑒 𝑣௧ିଵ) 0.128 0.122 0.346 -1.121 1.55 
 
0.145 0.135 0.317 -0.997 1.343 
ln(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥௧/𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑥௧ିଵ) 0.139 0.128 0.32 -0.978 1.398 
Strategy 18 18 4.596 6 30 
Dec 0.265 0 0.441 0 1 
Note: Sales and SG&A costs are in millions of RMB. 
4. Empirical Results 
We first investigate the effect of strategy on cost stickiness. We regress our model using two 
alternative dependent variables: SA&G and Cost. In Table 3, we estimate three different models using 
the GLS method (In order to avoid estimation biases, we used the generalized least squares (GLS) 
regression [53] to examine our hypotheses regarding the pattern of the data. Our data have the 
pattern of a time-series database, which violates the traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) 
assumptions, including homoscedasticity and no autocorrelation of the error term assumption [54]. 
In this case, OLS and weighted least squares can be statistically inefficient or even inferred 
misleading). The results are listed in Column I through Column III. The estimated result in Column 
I is based on the model used by Anderson et al. [3], which shows a β1 of 0.427 and a β2 of −0.211. The 
results are similar to Anderson et al. [3], Zheng and Hao [55], and Lei et al. [56]. Its economic meaning 
is that SA&G costs will increase by 43.7% when sales are up 1%, while they decrease only by 21.6% 
(equals 43.7% minus 21.1%) when sales are down 1%. The results in Column II and III are for Models 
(2) and (3). The strategy coefficient β3 is −0.015 and −0.012, both significant at 5% and 10%, 
respectively. This supports our first hypothesis that cost stickiness increases with the level of a 
differentiation strategy. We further regress Models (2) and (3) using fixed effects regression (A fixed 
effects regression model is a statistical model in which the model parameters are fixed or non-random 
quantities [57]. Random effects and mixed regression models in which all or some of the model 
parameters are considered as random variables are contrasting with this fixed effect regression model 
[57]) in Column IV and Ⅴ. The results are similar to GLS estimates, but the coefficients are slightly 
smaller. The cost stickiness coefficient β2 is −0.359 and −0.430, both significant at 5% and 10%, 
respectively. The strategy coefficient β3 is −0.017 and −0.015, both significant at 1%. Once again, these 
results support H1. In this study, the GLS and fixed effects regression procedures were performed in 
STATA 15 by using the program’s xt family of commands, which are suitable for handling 
longitudinal panel data. 
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Table 3. The relationship between strategy position and cost stickiness: using the logarithm of the 
change in SG&A (Selling, General and Administrative Expenses) as a dependent variable. 
D.V GLS Fixed Effects Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)  
0.427*** 0.413*** 0.409*** 0.423*** 0.418*** 
(26.66) (47.00) (45.93) (42.69) (41.20) 
Dec*Ln(Revt/Revt-1)  
−0.211*** −0.377* −0.434** −0.359* −0.430* 
(−7.66) (−1.79) (−2.06) (−1.75) (−1.85) 
Dec*Stategy * 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)  
 −0.015*** −0.012*** −0.017*** −0.015*** 
 (−4.25) (−3.32) (−4.52) (−3.76) 
Dec*Asset* 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1) 
 −0.036** −0.037*** −0.042*** −0.043*** 
 (-2.57) (−2.66) (−2.67) (−2.72) 
Dec*Emp* 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1) 
 −0.037*** −0.038*** −0.035*** −0.038*** 
 (−3.04) (−3.11) (−2.62) (−2.80) 
Dec*Suc_Dec* 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1) 
 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 
 (4.89) (4.91) (5.09) (5.16) 
Dec*Gdp  −0.001* −0.001* −0.001* −0.001* 
  (−1.71) (−1.77) (−1.79) (−1.76) 
Strategy   0.001***  0.002** 
   (3.07)  (2.45) 
_cons 0.077*** 0.084*** 0.059*** 0.074*** 0.036** 
 (24.80) (25.78) (6.71) (20.30) (2.29) 
N 20945 20945 20945 20945 20945 
r2_a 0.154 0.160 0.160 0.036 0.036 
Industries effect No No No Yes Yes 
Year effect  No No No Yes Yes 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
in two-tailed tests. The sample is collected from China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database from 2002–2015 winsorized at the 1% and 99%. The industries effect means industry-fixed 
effects (with industry dummies). Following the previous literature such as Banker and Chen [22], 
Kitching et al. [58], Li and Zheng [59], and Prabowo et al. [60], we use the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) to control for industry effects on firms’ cost behavior across all firms in each 
industry. To be specific, the SIC3 industry classification used for industry fixed effects is based on 
three-digit SIC codes. Seventy-two industries in total are controlled across all models such as A01 
professional technical service industry, B11 agriculture, C22 furniture manufacturing, E48 power, 
heat production and supply industry, and so on. Also, the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
change in SG&A (Selling, General and Administrative Expenses). Three different models are 
estimated using the generalized least squares (GLS) regression method, and the results are listed in 
Column Ⅰ through Ⅲ. To handle fixed effects, we further regress Models Ⅱ and III using generalized 
least squares (GLS) and fixed effects regression with the results in Columns Ⅳ and Ⅴ. 
Model Ⅰ: ln ቀ ௖௢௦ ௧೟௖௢௦ ௧೟షభቁ  =   𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵln(
ோ௘ ௩೟
ோ௘ ௩೟షభ) + 𝛽ଶDec ⋅ ln(
ோ௘ ௩೟
ோ௘ ௩೟షభ) + 𝜀௧ (5) 
Model Ⅱ:
 
ln ቀ ୡ୭ୱ୲౪ୡ୭ୱ୲౪షభቁ  =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝛽ଶ Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽ଷ Strategy୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝛽ସDec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
୅ୱୱୣ୲౪
ୖୣ୴౪ ቁ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽ହDec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ ⋅ ln ቀ
୉୫୮౪
ୖୣ୴౪ ቁ + 𝛽଺Dec୲ ⋅ Suc_Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽଻Dec୲ ⋅ GDP୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝜀௧ 
(6) 
Model Ⅲ:
 
ln ቀ ୡ୭ୱ୲౪ୡ୭ୱ୲౪షభቁ  =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝛽ଶStrategy୲ + 𝛽ଷ Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽ସDec୲ ⋅ Strategy୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝛽ହDec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
୅ୱୱୣ୲౪
ୖୣ୴౪ ቁ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽଺Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ ⋅ ln ቀ
୉୫୮౪
ୖୣ୴౪ ቁ + 𝛽଻Dec୲ ⋅ Suc_Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽଼Dec୲ ⋅ GDP୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝜀௧ 
(7) 
Considering that SA&G costs fall under the category of period expenses that are sensitive to the 
volume of business activities, we then re-examine the association between strategy position and cost 
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stickiness of Model (2) and Model (3) using the logarithm of operating costs as the dependent 
variable. We use both GLS and fixed effect regressions and report our results in Table 4. The 
coefficient of strategy is -0.008 and -0.01, both significant at 5% under GLS regression. The coefficient 
becomes slightly smaller at -0.012 and -0.013, respectively. Both are significant at 1%. These results 
imply that the differentiation strategy in the first quartile is 7.2% (0.012 * 6 = 0.072) in Column IV, or 
7.8% (0.013 * 6 = 0.078) in Column Ⅴ, greater than in the third quartile. The difference in cost stickiness 
between the first quartile and the third quartile is up to 0.288 (equals 0.012 * 24) in column Ⅳ, or 0. 
312 (0.013 * 24) in Column Ⅴ, which further supports our first hypothesis. The signs of other variables 
are consistent with those in Table 3. 
Table 4. The relationship between strategy position and cost stickiness: using the logarithm of the 
change in the operating costs as a dependent variable. 
D.V GLS Fixed Effects Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)  0.872*** 0.858*** 0.860*** 0.859*** 0.861*** (104.22) (93.06) (95.65) (91.01) (92.25) 
Dec*Ln(Revt/Revt-1)  
−0.117*** −0.646*** −0.621*** −0.731*** −0.702*** 
(−6.75) (−3.02) (−2.91) (−3.23) (−3.10) 
Dec*Stategy * 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1)  
 −0.008** −0.010** −0.012*** −0.013*** 
 (−2.19) (−2.45) (−2.90) (−3.09) 
Dec*Asset* 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1) 
 −0.035** −0.034** −0.030 −0.029 
 (−2.01) (−1.98) (−1.60) (−1.58) 
Dec*Emp* 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1) 
 −0.061*** −0.061*** −0.071*** −0.070*** 
 (−4.68) (−4.66) (−5.08) (−5.02) 
Dec*Suc_Dec* 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1) 
 −0.045* −0.045* −0.027 −0.028 
 (−1.89) (−1.90) (−1.15) (−1.18) 
Dec*Gdp  −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000 −0.000 
  (−3.05) (−3.01) (−1.08) (−1.06) 
Strategy   −0.001***  −0.001* 
   (−2.69)  (−1.81) 
_cons 0.019*** 0.027*** 0.038*** 0.024*** 0.039*** 
 (12.39) (13.82) (7.94) (10.62) (4.42) 
N 20947 20945 20945 20945 20945 
r2_a 0.806 0.813 0.813 0.805 0.805 
Industries effect No No No Yes Yes 
Year effect  No No No Yes Yes 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
in two-tailed tests. The sample is collected from CSMAR database from 2002–2015 winsorized at the 
1% and 99%. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the change in operating costs. Three different models 
are estimated using the GLS regression method and the results are presented in Column Ⅰ through 
Ⅲ. To handle fixed effects, we further regress Models Ⅱ and III using GLS and fixed effects regression 
with results reported in Column Ⅳ and Ⅴ.  
Model Ⅰ: ln ቀ ௖௢௦ ௧೟௖௢௦ ௧೟షభቁ =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵln(
ோ௘ ௩೟
ோ௘ ௩೟షభ) + 𝛽ଶDec ⋅ ln(
ோ௘ ௩೟
ோ௘ ௩೟షభ) + 𝜀௧ (8) 
Model Ⅱ:
 
ln ቀ ୡ୭ୱ୲౪ୡ୭ୱ୲౪షభቁ  = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝛽ଶ Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽ଷ Strategy୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝛽ସDec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
୅ୱୱୣ୲౪
ୖୣ୴౪ ቁ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽ହDec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ ⋅ ln ቀ
୉୫୮౪
ୖୣ୴౪ ቁ + 𝛽଺Dec୲ ⋅ Suc_Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽଻Dec୲ ⋅ GDP୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝜀௧  
(9) 
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Model Ⅲ:
 
ln ቀ ୡ୭ୱ୲౪ୡ୭ୱ୲౪షభቁ  =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝛽ଶStrategy୲ + 𝛽ଷ Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽ସDec୲ ⋅ Strategy୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝛽ହDec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
୅ୱୱୣ୲౪
ୖୣ୴౪ ቁ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽଺Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ ⋅ ln ቀ
୉୫୮౪
ୖୣ୴౪ ቁ + 𝛽଻Dec୲ ⋅ Suc_Dec୲ ⋅ ln ቀ
ୖୣ୴౪
ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ +
𝛽଼Dec୲ ⋅ GDP୲ ⋅ ln ቀ ୖୣ୴౪ୖୣ୴౪షభቁ + 𝜀௧ 
(10) 
We further conduct an empirical analysis of the relationship between managerial expectation 
and cost stickiness. To test our second hypothesis, we regress Model (5) with the logarithm change 
in SA&G costs as a dependent variable, using the GLS and fixed effect regressions, respectively. The 
results are reported in Column Ⅰ through Ⅲ in Table 5. The two types of managerial expectation 
coefficients are measured by the coefficient of β1PInc (0.471, significant at 1%) and β1PDec (0.365, 
significant at 1%), respectively. Costs increase 0.471%, with sales rising 1% under the optimistic 
scenario, while costs increase 0.365%, with sales rising 1% under the pessimistic scenario, which 
implies that marginal change in costs due to optimistic managers is 0.006% (0.471%–0.365%). 
Meanwhile, β2PInc is -0.27, significant at 5%, and β2PDec is 0.237, significant at 1%. Additionally, (β1PInc 
+β2PInc) = 0.2, which is (0.471–0.270), and (β1PDec + β2PDec) = 0.602, which is (0.365 + 0.237). The former 
means that costs decrease by 0.2% if sales decline 1% under the optimistic scenario, while the latter 
indicates that costs decline 0.602% if sales decrease 1% under the pessimistic scenario. Because (β1PInc 
+β2PInc) < (β1PDec + β2PDec) and β2PInc < 0, β2PDec > 0, optimistic managerial expectations will result in cost 
stickiness, while pessimistic managerial expectations will result in cost anti-stickiness. We reexamine 
the results with the logarithm of the change in operating costs as the dependent variables using GLS 
and fixed effect regressions. We find that β2PInc equals -0.288 and -0.374, respectively and both are 
significant at 1% while β2PDec is 0.460 and 0.482, both significant at 1%, which furthers our second 
hypothesis. 
Table 5. The relationship between strategy position, managerial expectation, and cost stickiness. 
D.V 
Ln(SGAt/SGAt-1)  Ln(OPECt/OPECt-1)  
Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ 
OLS OLS FE OLS FE 
It-1*ln(Revt/Revt-1) 0.496*** 0.488*** 0.471*** 0.905*** 0.899*** 
 (30.9) (30.21) (26.27) (133.05) (117.92) 
D t-1*ln(Revt/Revt-1) 0.357*** 0.352*** 0.365*** 0.824*** 0.828*** 
 (15.89) (15.54) (15.71) (63.8) (62.61) 
It-1*Dt*ln(Revt/Revt-1) −0.313*** −0.258** −0.270** −0.288*** −0.374*** 
 (−9.12) (−2.49) (−2.26) (−5.72) (−6.99) 
D t-1*Dt*ln(Revt/Revt-1) 0.126*** 0.348*** 0.237*** 0.460*** 0.482*** 
 (3.41) (2.61) (3.6) (5.52) (5.36) 
I t-1*Dt*Strategy* 
ln(Revt/Revt-1) 
 −0.029*** −0.032*** −0.019*** −0.025*** 
 (−5.58) (−5.43) (−6.73) (−8.39) 
D t-1*Dt*Stratgy* 
ln(Revt/Revt-1) 
 −0.022*** −0.020*** −0.028*** −0.030*** 
 (−3.51) (−2.88) (−6.43) (−6.35) 
_cons 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (24.12) (24.63) (19.55) (14.31) (10.97) 
N 20947 20947 20947 20947 20947 
r2_a 0.159 0.164 0.143 0.813 0.805 
Industries effect No No No Yes Yes 
Year effect  No No No Yes Yes 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
in two-tailed tests. We regress Model (5) with the the logarithmic change in SA&G costs as dependent 
variables using fixed effects regressions. 
Next, we provide empirical analysis on the association between strategy position, cost stickiness 
and managerial expectations. Since managerial expectations affect cost stickiness, this may moderate 
the relationship between strategy position and cost stickiness. To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate 
the models and report the results in Table 5. The coefficient of It－1*Dt*strategy*Ln (Revt/Revt－1), β3PInc, 
is −0.029 and −0.032 in Column Ⅱ and Ⅲ, respectively, while the coefficient of It-1*Dt*Ln(Revt/Revt－1), 
β2PInc, is −0.258 and −0.270, respectively. Therefore, the absolute value of (β3PInc + β2PInc) is greater than 
the absolute value of β2PInc. These results imply that optimistic managerial expectations will 
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strengthen cost stickiness with more differentiation, which supports H3a. When cost stickiness of a 
firm choosing a differentiation strategy is greater than that of a firm choosing cost leadership strategy, 
optimistic managers will view sales decreases as temporary adjustments, and thus they will be 
reluctant to cut back costs. Therefore, optimistic managerial expectations will increase cost stickiness. 
In addition, the coefficient of Dt－1 * Dt * Strategy * Ln(Revt/Revt－1), β3PDec, is −0.022 and −0.02 
(significant at 1%), respectively. β2PDec is 0.348 and 0.237 in Column Ⅱ and Ⅲ, and (β2PDec + β3PDec) is 
0.326 and 0.217, respectively. These results indicate that pessimistic managerial expectations will 
decrease cost stickiness, which supports hypothesis H3b. Similarly, we test the results using the 
logarithm of the change in operating costs and the estimators in Column Ⅳ and Ⅴ, respectively. These 
results are consistent with our previously stated results. For example, β3PInc is −0.019 and −0.025 (both 
significant at 1%), while β3PDec is −0.028 and −0.030 (both significant at 1%). The results provide further 
robust evidence supporting H3b. 
Finally, H4 argues that equity will affect cost stickiness under different strategies. To test this 
hypothesis, we divide the full sample into two sub-samples, state-owned, and non-owned firms. We 
run regressions using robust standard error based on model (2) and model (3), and the results are 
reported in Table 6. We want to test how equity affects the effect of differential strategy on cost 
stickiness; hence, we have to merge the equity data into the sample. Therefore, the value of the 
variable state is 1 when firms are state-owned and 0 if not. The equity data is only available from 2003 
to 2014; therefore, our observations are reduced to 14,273, with 8,174 state-owned firms and 6,099 
non-state-owned firms. 
Table 6. The relationship between strategy and cost stickiness under state-owned and non-state-
owned firms. 
D.V 
I II III IV 
State-Owned Firms Non-State-Owned Firms 
lnRev 0.876*** 0.994*** 0.818*** 0.975*** 
 (87.61) (121.58) (56.65) (92.79) 
Dec*Ln(Revt/Revt-1) −0.625*** −0.409*** −0.918*** −0.075 
 (−4.33) (−3.01) (−4.67) (−0.45) 
Dec*Stategy * 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1) 
−0.004** −0.003** −0.003* −0.002* 
 (−2.85) (−2.92) (−1.82) (−1.81) 
DecAssetlnRev −0.039** −0.025* −0.039* −0.026** 
 (−2.35) (1.90) (−2.01) (−2.11) 
DecEmplnRev −0.043*** −0.023** −0.073*** −0.010* 
 (−4.20) (−2.32) (−5.25) (−1.86) 
DecSuclnRev 0.039* 0.057*** −0.029** −0.009 
 (1.87) (3.00) (−1.99) (−0.42) 
DecGdp −0.001** 0.001 −0.001** 0.001* 
 (−2.45) (0.02) (−1.98) (1.78) 
Strategy  −0.001*  −0.001* 
  (−1.83)  (−1.88) 
_cons 0.016*** 0.004 0.024*** 0.002 
 (9.03) (1.58) (8.52) (0.32) 
Industries effect YES YES YES YES 
Year effect  YES YES YES YES 
N 8174 8174 6099 6099 
r2_a 0.878 0.894 0.814 0.874 
F 3009.598 3542.113 1789.908 3551.244 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, 
in two-tailed tests. We regress Model (2) and (3) with the a logarithm change in operating costs as 
dependent variable using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. 
The results in Columns I and III control for the strategy, and Columns II and IV incorporate the 
strategy. First, the coefficients of Dec * Stategy * Ln(Revt/Revt-1) is -0.004 in state-owned firms and -
0.003 in non-state-owned firms, respectively, and both are significant at 1% without incorporating 
the sole strategy. The magnitude of these results is 33.3% greater in the state-owned sample than in 
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the non-state-owned sample. We then control for the strategy, and the coefficients of Dec * Strategy * 
Ln(Revt/Revt-1) are -0.003 in state-owned firms and significant at 1% but reduced to -0.002 in a non-
state-owned sample and significant at 10%. This means that strategy has a stronger effect on cost 
stickiness in state-owned firms than in non-state-owned firms, which supports our fourth hypothesis. 
This study conducts several robustness checks. First, this paper uses balanced panel data and 
runs GLS and fixed-effects regressions. Second, differences between SOEs and private firms may 
increase a possible bias in the estimates, due to the potentially mis-specified relation between the 
dependent and independent variables [61]. The paper, therefore, uses a propensity score matching 
(PSM) to match SOEs with comparable private firms by selecting the private firms that are most 
similar to SOEs, according to the distribution of observed covariates [62]. The paper alters Borisova 
et al.’s [50] procedure and utilizes size, sales growth, return on assets, leverage, stock value traded as 
a percentage of GDP, and industry to fit the observations for SOEs with them of private firm. This 
study reruns the regression Equation on our PSM observations. Third, cost behavior tends to change 
during economic crises [32]. Thus, we rerun the regression until the year 2007, which was before the 
latest financial crisis. Finally, to address the problematic possibility of endogeneity that leads to 
inconsistent regression estimation, this study utilizes an alternative estimation method known as 
instrumental variables or equivalently two-stage least squares (2SLS) [63]. Accordingly, we introduce 
an instrument variable inducing changes in the explanatory variable but has no independent impact 
on our dependent variable; thus, allowing us to reveal the causal effect of the explanatory variable 
on our dependent variable [63]. Yet, we find that the results are similar to our previous empirical 
results. Although the level of significance may be decreased using the balanced panel data, the signs 
of the coefficients are consistent and the similarity with the significance level, which further illustrates 
that our results are robust.  
In Table 7, we summarize the results of the regression analyses from hypotheses 1 to 4. We find 
that all the hypotheses are supported except for H3b. 
Table 7. Summary of the results of the regression analyses: Hypotheses 1–4. 
Hypotheses Hypotheses Main Findings 
H1 
The cost stickiness of firms using differentiation 
strategy will be higher than that of firms using 
low-cost strategy. 
The cost stickiness of firms choosing 
differentiation strategy is higher than that of 
those choosing a low-cost strategies. 
Support 
H2 
Managers’ optimism will result in cost 
stickiness, while managers’ pessimism will 
result in cost anti-stickiness. 
Optimistic management expectations will 
strengthen cost stickiness, while pessimistic 
expectations will weaken cost anti-stickiness. 
Support 
H3a 
If management is optimistic, firms that choose 
differentiation strategy have higher cost 
stickiness than those that choose low-cost 
strategies 
If management is optimistic, cost stickiness of 
firms choosing a differentiation strategy is 
higher than that of those choosing a low-cost 
strategy 
Support 
H3b 
If management is pessimistic, firms that choose a 
low-cost strategy have higher cost anti-stickiness 
than those that choose a differentiation strategy 
Do not find evidence. Reject 
H4 
Compared to non-state-owned firms, a 
differentiation strategy in a state-owned firms 
has a more impact on cost stickiness. 
State-owned firms have stronger cost stickiness 
than non-state-owned firms adopting a 
differentiation strategy.  
Support 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
5.1. Conclusions 
Following a competitive strategy for business development is the key to a business’s success. 
Based on data of China A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2002–2015, we 
investigate the relationship between a firm's competitive strategy and cost stickiness, and we find the 
following results. 
First, the results show that the cost stickiness of firms that choose differentiation strategy is 
higher than that of those choosing low-cost strategies. This is because following differentiation 
strategy maintains or increases a high-profit margin by providing quality products or services to 
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customers through a centralized competition [33], which requires companies to invest massively in 
crucial areas such as product development, brand building, and advertising. On the other hand, cost 
strategy requires more effort to control costs in order to provide products or services with the lowest 
possible price, which means that firms using cost strategy must focus on improving yield and 
capacity utilization and minimize indirect costs and other expenses, based on the actual cost of 
competitors.  
Second, when managers make decisions about whether and how to adjust their resource 
capacity, they will make appropriate investment decisions based on current and future sales. 
Therefore, a manager’s expectations for the future will affect firm investment decisions and costs. To 
be specific, optimistic management expectations will strengthen cost stickiness, while pessimistic 
expectations will weaken cost anti-stickiness. If the management is optimistic, the cost stickiness of 
companies choosing a differentiation strategy will be higher than that of those choosing a low-cost 
strategy. Conversely, if the management is pessimistic, the cost anti-stickiness of companies choosing 
a low-cost strategy will be higher than that of firms choosing a differentiation strategy.  
Finally, state-owned equity affects the extent of the effect of differentiation strategy on cost 
stickiness. State-owned firms, which hold more GCAs than non-state-owned firms, have stronger 
cost stickiness than non-state-owned firms, even if both categories of firms use differentiation 
strategy more. 
5.2. Theoretical and Managerial/Policy Implications 
This paper has some theoretical implications. First, this paper is one of the limited studies that 
connect OT and MC theory to accounting studies for cost management research. Second, the paper 
makes a validation for the fact that different business strategists indeed present dissimilar levels of 
cost stickiness, and this reveals if the corporate strategy is a crucial factor for earnings management. 
Third, the present study proves the validation that corporate strategy has an even wider application 
to cost management than anteriorly regarded. Lastly, but not least, this paper exhibits how the 
interplay of corporate strategy and property tends to influence cost stickiness as an extension of both 
the property theory and the cost management literature. 
This study also has several managerial and policy implications. Both the corporate strategy 
chosen and the ownership are core factors that influence cost stickiness. The corporate strategy of 
firms will influence managers’ decisions about resource commitment and further reflect how cost 
management is controlled. Therefore, this internal mechanism can provide some microcosmic action 
reference for companies to implement cost management and improve the corporate governance 
mechanism. 
Adding to the existing literature’s understanding of these mechanisms, at the level of policy 
operation, our study provides a new way of cognition to explore the effectiveness and rationality of 
strategic positioning and management expectations. In addition, it provides innovative ideas for a 
further strategic selection, investment decision, and cost control. The empirical results show that 
different corporate strategies and ownership will produce different cost behaviors. Therefore, to 
enhance the strategic positioning of companies and the effectiveness and rationality of management 
expectations, managers must correctly understand changes in the firm’s external environment, 
thereby achieving effective controls of costs. Simultaneously, firms should guide and standardize the 
business process, actively play their roles in the market, and further optimize and improve their 
internal and external environment, thus allowing them to sustain harmonious and healthy 
development.  
Another way our study contributes to the literature is that it addresses government-created 
institutional advantages, which are considered “probably the most important variable suggested by 
the research” on internationalizing emerging market firms, in particular Chinese firms [43, p. 42]. 
This type of institutional advantage “is relevant in most emerging economies because governments 
usually play a strategic role in developing economies.” The various “channels through which GCAs 
work are available to all government, even if other countries are not as big as China or not as 
competent at using these policy levers,” and the prominent role of state-owned firms among 
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internationalizing Chinese firms is just one aspect of China’s institutional advantages [43, p. 42]. 
Chinese firms’ business strategy, state-owned equity, and cost stickiness are meaningful in China’s 
institutional aspects linked to GCAs.  
Finally, as an extension of our findings, we need to speculate that cost stickiness can be directly 
and indirectly related to economic growth [64], political uncertainty [65], and credit risk [66]. 
Managers at internationalizing emerging market firms, particularly Chinese firms, should think over 
how these factors can be related to their institutional advantages. 
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
This study has meaningful theoretical and managerial/policy implications, but there are also 
some limitations, thus launching further research. First, this paper examines the relationship between 
corporate strategy and cost stickiness under different managerial expectations in the companies in 
China. However, it does not test our hypothesis in the contexts and samples of other countries, such 
as other developed and emerging economies. For example, traditionally, companies from American 
and Western European countries have evolved with the different corporate strategies and cost 
stickiness under different managerial expectations from companies in China as well as in other 
emerging markets, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. Even, in the representative 
emerging markets, China and India have very different corporate histories and corporate 
governances [67,68] that might have affected these factors. Hence, comparative studies among these 
dissimilar countries are needed to compare our findings with others.  
Second, our sample firms are all listed companies. However, even in China, there are many non-
listed firms, particularly small and medium-sized private firms that have metamorphosed as the 
creative innovators in both domestic and global markets [69,70]. Hence, the comparative study 
between listed and non-listed companies, particularly small and medium-sized non-listed 
enterprises, is necessary as future research.  
Third, although there are differences between industry sectors, this study does not investigate 
our hypotheses in the comparison between industry sectors. For example, the energy, transportation, 
and waste sectors [71] can have different connotations from the manufacturing sector using digital 
platforms [72]; thus, they can have quite heterogeneous industry effects in our sample. Hence, as 
future research, we need to cover the agenda of the different industrial sectors.  
Fourth, since large emerging markets, such as China, are rapidly internationalizing markets 
where domestic and foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) operate based on both inward and 
outward foreign direct investments (FDIs) [73,74], the internationalizing companies’ strategic choices 
are crucial due to how it affects cost structure and cost stickiness. However, this study does not catch 
the essence of these MNEs’ strategic choices and their influences on cost structure and cost stickiness 
well. Hence, future research needs to cover this important issue.  
Finally, due to our data accessibility limitedness, we could not include more control variables 
dealing with some issues such as corporate governance, political stability, regulations, and economic 
issues. Nevertheless, this paper splits the full sample into the subsamples of state-owned and non-
state-owned firms, so in this way, we cover corporate governance of listed companies in China. Also, 
we control for the annual GDP growth rate, so we cover at least one economic issue. However, during 
our sample period, at least in China, political stability and regulations have not significantly changed 
[75,76], and further, our sample country is only one so that this paper could not include these control 
variables that covers political stability and regulations. Yet, as future studies, with the larger sample 
of various countries, we may add these more control variables.  
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